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From the Legal Literature
Criminalizing Propaganda: J. Remy Green’s
Argument to Digitize Brandenburg
Francesca Laguardia, J.D., Ph.D.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the threat of terrorism came to the forefront of the public
consciousness, there has been a tension between First Amendment
protections for political speech and the types of criminal prohibitions
lawmakers believed necessary to counter the terror threat. The first
counterterror statutes the United States enacted—the prohibitions
on providing material support to terrorist organizations—were part of
this tension. Indeed, the manner in which these laws imposed on
First Amendment activities was the subject of a great deal of debate
before their passage.1 But over the last two decades, terrorist
organizations have become so sophisticated in their use of online
propaganda and social media to radicalize and recruit new extremists has become so prevalent that many scholars have become
concerned about the tension between online speech and the
counterterror interests of the state.2
Academic treatment of the subject has varied. Authors have
1

David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147
(2012); Andrew Peterson, Addressing Tomorrow’s Terrorists, 2 J. NAT’L. SEC. L. &
POL’Y. 297 (2008) (describing the history and creation of material support statutes
and multiple First Amendment challenges before and after their passage).
2

Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and
Internet Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 379, 381 (2017); Erik Eckholm, ISIS
Influence on Web Prompts Second Thoughts on First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/us/isis-influence-on-web-prompts-se
cond-thoughts-on-first-amendment.html; Daniel Hoffman, Online Terrorism
Advocacy: How AEDPA and Inchoate Crime Statutes Can Simultaneously Protect
America’s Safety and Free Speech, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 200, 251 (2014) (arguing that
new laws to address “online terrorism advocacy” are unnecessary because “existing
AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] and inchoate crime statutes
and their associated case law” give prosecutors “the tools to explore and better
evolve the legal boundaries that Congress intended based on the threat”); Peter
Margulies, The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the First
Amendment, 8 UCLA L.J. & TECH. 4 (2004); Abigail M. Pierce, #Tweeting for Terrorism: First Amendment Implications in Using Proterrorist Tweets to Convict Under
the Material Support to Terrorism Statute, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 251 (2015);
Eric Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice But to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/12/isiss-online-radicalizati
on-efforts-present-an-unprecedented-danger.html (“We do not currently face a
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concluded that the existing balance between speech rights and
government oversight is sufficient; 3 that the existing statutory
framework presents an unacceptable violation of First Amendment
interests;4 and that existing First Amendment doctrine (represented
by the balance struck in Brandenburg v. Ohio5) must be modified to
allow more prosecution of online speech.6 An entire literature exists
that discusses either the threat or promise of creating exceptions to
First Amendment protection based on national security interests.7
Alan Chen and Mark Tushnet have identified a second area of
exceptionalism relevant to this area as well, that of internet
exceptionalism.8 These arguments rely on the notion that the internet
fundamentally changes the ramifications and practices of the
marketplace of ideas by lessening the cost to the speaker, amplifying the reach of the speech, and allowing greater anonymity.9 In the
case of terrorist propaganda, recruitment, and incitement, these
characteristics arguably create a greater threat by allowing for faster
and more wide reaching responses.10 Probably because of these
strengths, social media and other forms of online communication
national emergency comparable to a world war, but anti-propaganda laws may
nonetheless be warranted because of the unique challenge posed by ISIS’s
sophisticated exploitation of modern technology.”); Cass Sunstein, Islamic State’s
Challenge to Free Speech, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.
com/opinion/articles/2015-11-23/islamic-state-s-challenge-to-free-speech; Alexander
Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAN. L REV. 651, 688 (2017); Benjamin
Wittes & Zoe Bedell, Tweeting Terrorists, Part III: How Would Twitter Defend Itself
Against a Material Support Prosecution, LAWFARE (Feb. 14, 2016, 7:16 PM), https://w
ww.lawfareblog.com/tweeting-terrorists-part-iii-how-would-twitter-defend-itself-again
st-material-support-prosecution.
3

E.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The
Continuing Importance of Brandenburg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. 361, 362–63 (2010);
Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 731
(2009); Hoffman, supra note 2, at 204, 251.
4

E.g., Rachel VanLandingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material
Support to Terrorism, and Muzzling the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2017).
5

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969)
(per curiam).
6

E.g., Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 147, 148, 164 (2011); Tsesis, supra note 2, at 708.
7

See, e.g., Chen, supra note 2, at 380; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953, 955–56 (2002); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 3 (2007); GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004).
8

Chen, supra note 2, at 380; Mark Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An
Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1637, 1639
(2015).
9

Chen, supra note 2 at 391–92; Tushnet, supra note 8, at 1651–62.

10

Chen, supra note 2 at 393; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 69 (2007).
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have become the primary means of terrorist radicalization and
recruitment.11
At the same time, however, online communication has become a
central means of classic U.S. political education and expression.12
Social media platforms facilitate communication through the creation
of online communities.13 These communities do not merely function
to communicate news; they have become the primary source of
news for a majority of people in the United States.14 In many ways,
social media communication may be seen as “today’s ‘free press.’ ’’15
This arguably entitles it to greater, rather than lesser, protection
under traditional First Amendment interpretation. 16 Under this
interpretation, the press performs a fundamental role in a democratic
society as newspapers (and similar media) “giv[e] ‘voice to public
criticism.’ ’’17
While the threat posed by speech increases due to the special
characteristics of the internet, so too do the benefits of speech
protections. This presents a paradox in which social media embodies core First Amendment interests which, in turn, increases the
interest in protecting its free use, even though the reach of social
media increases its harm. Additionally, the inherent uncertainty
regarding who precisely is speaking at any given time adds to
concerns of unconstitutional vagueness.18
From a practical perspective thus far, the constitutionality of online
support for terrorists has rested on whether the speaker may be
considered to be speaking in coordination with a foreign terrorist
organization [FTO].19 The U.S. Supreme Court has specified that in
addition to speech that provides training or exhortations to violence,
speech that merely confers legitimacy (without specifically advocat11

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 13–16.

12

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 112–13.

13

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 9.

14

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 12–13.

15

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 13.

16

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 22–29.

17

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 26 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 278, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 1 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1527,
95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964)).
18

VanLandingham, supra note 4, at 40–50.

19

Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 177 L.
Ed. 2d 355, 49 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 567 (2010); U.S. v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 49, 92
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1167 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Robert Chesney, The Sleeper
Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 1, 4–18 (2005); Thomas Crocker, Free Speech and Terrorist Speech: An
Essay on Dangerous Ideas. 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 49, 54 (2017); VanLandingham,
supra note, at 5.
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ing for violence or unlawful conduct) may be prosecuted under 18
U.S.C.A. § 2339B (criminalizing the provision of material support to
an FTO), but only when it is not independent advocacy.20 The Court’s
opinion also relies on the connection with a designated foreign
organization, expressly stating that it makes no statement as to the
constitutionality of treating domestic matters similarly.21
In the last decade, the threat of terrorism has shifted from
organizations to decentralized movements, including domestic
ones.22 This transformation, along with the intensity of the supposed
threat from online radicalization and the remaining questions regarding just how far § 2339B prosecutions will be taken, has prevented
the First Amendment debate from being entirely settled.23 In this
remaining uncertainty, the test set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio
remains of central importance.24 The fundamental question regarding
Brandenburg’s application to online speech is whether it qualifies as
inciting “imminent lawless action.”25 I J. Remy Green takes up this
question in the article, “Digitizing Brandenburg.”26 Green accurately
points out that the imminence requirement in Brandenburg seems
nearly impossible to fulfill in the context of most contemporary
advocacy for terrorism because listeners are remote and uncertain;
thus, there is no way to confidently determine whether violent
conduct will follow imminently upon posting.27 Nonetheless, Green
argues such temporal proximity is not necessary in order to meet
some understandings of the word “imminent.”28 Green also explains
20

Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24, 30–34 (reasoning that a person
who acts on behalf of or at the direction of an FTO may be punished, but a person
who independently agrees with the FTO and speaks with no direct connection to
the FTO should be protected by the First Amendment).
21

Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 39.

22

Francesca Laguardia, From the Legal Literature: The Legal Divide Between
Domestic and International Terrorism—Do We Need a Domestic Terror Statute?, 55
CRIM. L. BULL. 1093 (2019); Jesse Norris, Why Dylann Roof Is a Terrorist Under
Federal Law, and Why It Matters, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 259 (2017); Shirin Sinnar,
Separate and Unequal: The Law of “Domestic” and “International” Terrorism, 117
MICH. L. REV. 1333 (2019).
23

See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text.

24

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430
(1969) (per curiam).
25

Chen, supra note 2, at 394–95; Crocker, supra note 19, at 51–59; Hoffman,
supra note 2, at 203; Lidsky, supra note 6, at 160; Tsesis, supra note 2, at 686–91.
26

J. Remy Green, Digitizing Brandenburg: Common Law Drift Toward a Causal
Theory of Imminence 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 351 (2019).
27

Green, supra note 26, at 360–63, 385; see also Lidsky, supra note 6, at 160;
Tsesis, supra note 2, at 667.
28

Green, supra note 26, at 354.
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that courts are already moving toward this conception of imminent
as well.29
II. J. Remy Green, Digitizing Brandenburg: Common Law Drift
Toward a Causal Theory of Imminence, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV.
351 (2019).
Green begins with a discussion of the development of the Brandenburg test, tracing the doctrine from its origins in Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten30 to Abrams v. United States31 and Hess v. Indiana.32
But while now well established, the test is hardly consistently applied.
Green points out:
Courts have found lawless activity is spatiotemporally imminent where
the speaker: sent an email encouraging “electronic civil disobedience”
on a specified date; published a book with detailed instructions on how
to become a “hit man”; counseled and directly assisted preparing false
tax returns; held up a sign on television at a school event proclaiming
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”; and offered a reward to anyone “who kills,
maims, or seriously injures a member of the American Nazi Party” at
an event five weeks away. However, courts have found lawless activity
not to be spatiotemporally imminent where the speaker(s): posted a list
of “Top Twenty Terror Tactics” online; led a Klu Klux Klan (KKK) rally
where members were wielding fire arms, burning a cross, and chanting
“bury the n*****rs” and promising “revengeance” (this being Brandenburg itself); created violent video games and pornography that purportedly inspired violence in the real world; were fundamentalist preachers
who preached that the Bible commands that Christians must violate
truancy laws; published an article painting autoerotic asphyxiation in
glowing terms; created digitally synthesized child pornography; created
posters celebrating the killing of abortion doctors and identifying doctors who had not yet been killed; posted personal information combined
with racist and homophobic rhetoric on white supremacist forums;
recorded and released the song “Suicide Solution” advocating suicide;
called for a strike in a newspaper advertisement in violation of a court
order; sold books and magazines whose “primary purpose [encouraged] illegal drug use” at self-identified “head shops”; and urged killing
a judge on a public blog.33

To highlight the inconsistency of court rulings, Green points to the
contradiction between language in two U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals decision: Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc. and United States v.
Fullmer:
29

Green, supra note 26, at 355.

30

Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540, (S.D. N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F.
24 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1917).
31

Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 624, 40 S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
32

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108, 94 S. Ct. 326, 38 L. Ed. 2d 303 (1973)
(quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430
(1969) (per curiam)); see also Green, supra note 26, at 357–59.
33

Green, supra note 26, at 360–62 (internal citations omitted).
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Imminent: “The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of
methods of terror . . . should be beyond the pale.”
Not Imminent: “[T]he publication of the ‘Top Twenty Terror Tactics,’
without more, is also protected, because although it lists illegal conduct,
there is no suggestion that [Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)]
planned to imminently implement these tactics.”34

Green further points out the willingness of courts to find a risk of imminent lawless action when speech is advocacy for tax evasion.35
Based on these inconsistencies and further examination of the
cases, Green argues that the time has come for a new understanding of the First Amendment exception for incitement to imminent
lawless activity. Green uses the common law reasoning of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.36 as a model for constitutional innovation.37
Relying on David Strauss’s explanation of Judge Cardozo’s reasoning in MacPherson, Green suggests that common law innovation is
appropriate when “1) the old regime is no longer workable and (2)
though the courts are ostensibly applying the old rule, they are in
reality, slowly gravitating towards a new rule.”38 Green argues that
the inconsistency demonstrated in the cases described above shows
that the current understanding of imminence is unworkable.39 A better solution, according to Green, would be to understand that imminence need not refer solely to temporal proximity, but might
instead be understood as “causal.”40
To flesh out causal imminence, Green first analogizes the test for
proximate cause: “[a]n act is a proximate cause of an injury if [(1)] it
was a substantial factor in bringing about that injury, and if [(2)] the
injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s
act.”41 Green notes that “imminence” is frequently used as part of the
reasoning to find proximate cause, but in such cases, it refers to
inevitability rather than temporal proximity.42 Using a case where a
poison was mislabeled, Green explains that “even if there were an
enormous gap in time and space between a doctor’s purchase of
34

Green, supra note 26, at 362 (citing Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128
F.3d 233, 249, 25 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2441 (4th Cir. 1997)); U.S. v. Fullmer, 584
F.3d 132, 141, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 659 (3d Cir. 2009)).
35

Green, supra note 26, at 365.

36

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, 1050 (1916).

37

Green, supra note 26, at 366–68.

38

Green, supra note 26, at 366 (citing David Strauss, The Common Law Genius
of the Warren Court, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 845, 855–56 (2007)).
39

Green, supra note 26, at 368–70.

40

Green, supra note 26, at 370, 375–82.

41

Green, supra note 26, at 376.

42

Green, supra note 26, at 376–77.
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what he thought was dandelion extract (a mild medicine) and his
administration of belladonna (a deadly poison) in its place, the entire
time, the mislabeled canister was simply waiting to cause its harm.”43
Green argues that similar logic better explains the confusion of
cases evaluating imminence in the context of speech—“it should not
matter that Hit Man [a book offering instructions on performing and
covering up a murder] had sat apparently harmless on a shelf for ten
years after its publication (likely spatially far away from where it was
initially written) before it provided the blueprint to a gruesome triple
murder in 1993, because the harm was imminent in the nature of the
book.”44
As further argument, Green references Judge Posner’s hypothetical “entrapment machine”—a government-created machine that both
enables a defendant to commit a crime (who would not have been
able to otherwise), and makes the crime so easy and enticing that if
the machine just sits and waits, surely someone will eventually come
along to commit it.45 The existence of the machine makes the crime
inevitable, in the long term, and places responsibility for causing the
crime on the government that created the machine.46 Similarly, Green
posits, “The internet is, in effect, a lawless action machine.”47 Harassment and revenge porn cases, for instance, show that one need
only provide name, relevant identifying information, and nude photos
in order for harassment to become inevitable—even if not
immediate.48 The nature of the internet is such that “if the only causal
step left is equivalent to pressing a button, someone is inevitably going to press that button.”49
Green concludes by returning to the question of incitement of terrorist action. They use examples of the type of decentralized,
undirected violence that is more common in modern times—violence
in response to praise of the idea of violence, posted online without
any specificity as to listener, and without any particular direction—
such as Milo Yiannopoulos’s statement that “I can’t wait for the
vigilante squads to start gunning journalists down on sight.”50 If
violence is committed by people who actively follow Yiannopoulos,
43

Green, supra note 26, at 377.

44

Green, supra note 26, at 377.

45

Green, supra note 26, at 377–79 (citing U.S. v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196,
1199–2000 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejected by, U.S. v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 89 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 647 (2d Cir. 2013)) (en banc) (emphasis added)).
46

Green, supra note 26, at 378.

47

Green, supra note 26, at 379.

48

Green, supra note 26, at 379.

49

Green, supra note 26, at 380.

50

Green, supra note 26, at 380–85.
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or if shooters were found to have retweeted those messages, Green
concludes the language would have been proven to be incitement.51
IV. CONCLUSION
One has to wonder how Green’s proposed framework would apply
to, for instance, a book about a hit man, rather than one which
purports to give instructions on how to be one. For instance, we
might expect that Yiannopoulos has seen the prevalence of violence
and animosity towards journalists. But should we expect the same
level of forethought for all public speakers who may bear personal
animus against journalists? Green’s analogy to the entrapment
machine is somewhat problematic in that Posner’s entrapment
machine provides an incentive to commit the crime. By contrast,
Yiannopoulos only states his own opinion, albeit in an incendiary
climate in which he knows that his opinion may reach willing listeners via the endless reach of the internet.
In short, Green’s suggestion would be a huge departure from prior
understandings of incitement to imminent lawlessness. Nonetheless,
Green is correct that his analyses seem to reflect judicial movement
towards less temporally restricted causal models of dangerous
speech.52 If nothing else, Green provides a valuable exercise in
analyzing the risks and responsibilities of our modern methods of
communication while highlighting the ongoing debate regarding the
dangerousness of online speech.
51

Green, supra note, 26 at 380–85.

52

See also Lidsky, supra note 6, at 160, 164.
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